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Abstract
We document the benefits of mandatory portfolio disclosure in the hedge fund mar-
ket. We study investor purchasing and selling decisions, captured by hedge fund flows.
After a fund begins filing Form 13F with the Securities and Exchange Commission, we
find that investor flows are better able to predict fund performance (i.e., money be-
comes “smarter”). In particular, the spread in performance between high- and low-flow
funds is 3.7 percentage points higher for 13F-filing funds compared with non-filers. We
analyze cross-sectional differences in the precision, usefulness, and access of informa-
tion, and find evidence that the increase in smart money is driven by the information
channel. In addition, using a subset of funds of hedge funds (“FoFs”) for which we have
holdings data, we find that FoFs earn superior returns on their portfolios of 13F-filing
hedge funds. These results help contribute to the cost-benefit analysis of mandatory
disclosure.
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1 Introduction
Since 1979, hedge funds have been required to publicly disclose their quarterly equity holdings
via Form 13F filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). This disclosure of
proprietary information is costly; it induces copycat trading and leads to large reductions in
fund returns.1 However, both the SEC and the public have long held the view that portfolio
disclosure benefits fund investors.2 They claim that Form 13F helps investors evaluate fund
managers, and make more informed (i.e., smarter) investment decisions. Indeed, Agarwal,
Ruenzi, and Weigert (2018c) demonstrate that Form 13F helps the econometrician predict
hedge fund performance.3 In this paper, we provide evidence that real-world investors use the
information contained in 13F filings, and this information helps improve their fund selection
ability.
In particular, we study how public disclosure affects aggregate investor decisions, proxied
using the quarterly net fund flows into a given hedge fund. We employ a “follow the money”
approach, to see whether investments subsequently lead to good performance, and whether
divestments avoid bad performance. This relationship between past fund flows and future
performance (if it exists) is referred to as the “smart money” effect in the literature.4 We
1Brown and Schwarz (2013) document evidence that copycat traders mimic trades revealed in public
hedge fund disclosure. Shi (2017) quantifies the cost of public disclosure, and finds that after funds disclose
their holdings, their average risk-adjusted performance drops by about 2.7 percentage points annually. Cao,
Du, Yang, and Zhang (2018) use the SEC EDGAR log files, combined with public disclosure reported on
Form 13F to identify copycats and targets. They find that copycats induce a performance loss of 2.56 p.p. on
target funds.
2The SEC solicited public feedback after it announced the adoption of Rule 13f-1, which required quarterly
reporting. The SEC received 124 letters, and the SEC remarked:
A number of commentators pointed out that quarterly reporting would provide a greater basis
for comparison shopping among investment managers. Such commentators emphasized that
an evaluation of the investment philosophy and policies of a prospective manager is crucial
in making an effective comparison and that such an evaluation is dependent upon a periodic
examination of a manager’s investment decisions as reflected by his holdings transactions.
(See: Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15461. January 5, 1979.)
3Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009) also demonstrates in
the mutual fund market that the portfolio information contained in public disclosure predicts mutual fund
returns.
4See Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Sapp and Tiwari (2004) for a discussion of the smart money effect
among mutual fund investors, and Baquero and Verbeek (2005), Getmansky, Liang, Schwarz, and Wermers
(2015b), and Ozik and Sadka (2015) for discussion of smart money in the hedge fund market.
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study (1) how the smart money effect differs among hedge funds that file Form 13F and
those that do not, and (2) at the firm-level, how the smart money effect changes after the
fund begins filing Form 13F.
Our setting is similar to Shi (2017), who was the first to quantify the negative impact
of public disclosure on fund performance. We use a fund-time panel of fund flows and
performance to study how the impact of 13F filing requirements affects the sensitivity of
future performance to past fund flows. This setting enjoys several features that are important
for causally identifying the costs and benefits of regulation (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). (1)
The initial law requiring portfolio disclosure is plausibly exogenous to the hedge fund market.
Congress enacted section 13(f) in 1975,5 in order to give the SEC power to monitor the market
impact of all institutional investors (e.g., banks, mutual funds, pension plans, etc.).6 At the
time, the hedge fund market was still in its infancy. (2) There is a threshold condition for
filing 13F. A firm is required to file Form 13F once it invests more than $100 million in
13(f) securities.7 This provides treatment and control groups. (3) Form 13F is filed at the
parent company level, and a parent might have several hedge funds. Thus, for two otherwise
identical funds, one might belong to a filing parent, and the other might belong to a non-
filing parent. Indeed, there is a large overlap in the distribution of fund size between the
control and treatment groups,8 and this allows us to control for fund size. (4) The filing
threshold yields a staggered panel, thus firms (and by transitivity, funds) cross the threshold
at different times. This allows us to control for market-wide effects that may impact all
filers.
We study the smart money effect in two ways. First, we employ a portfolio-based analysis.
5See: Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 119 (1975) available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
STATUTE-89/pdf/STATUTE-89-Pg97.pdf#page=25.
6See Report of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 85 (1975). The Senate noted the need for regulators to monitor the influence and impact of institutional
investors on the securities markets. In particular, to ensure investor confidence in equity markets.
713(f) securities typically equity securities registered with the SEC under Section 12 of the Securities and
Exchange Act. The SEC provides a full list of all 13(f) securities every quarter to facilitate the filing of Form
13F: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13flists.htm.
8See Figure 1 in Shi (2017) for a distribution of fund size for the treatment and control groups.
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We double-sort hedge funds based on 13F filing status (i.e., whether they have previously
filed 13F or not), and then, within each group, we sort funds into quartiles by past fund
flows. In each filing-status group, we form a long-short portfolio by longing the the high-flow
funds (top quartile), and shorting the low-flow funds (bottom quartile). We consider this
portfolio to be a dollar-neutral measure of smart money, and is similar in construction to
the main smart money analysis performed in Zheng (1999) and Sapp and Tiwari (2004).
We compare the high-low flow portfolio for filers versus non-filers, and find evidence that
the smart money effect is larger among filing funds, compared to non-filers. In particular,
the difference in performance spread is 34 basis points (“bps”) of monthly excess returns
and 31 bps of monthly Fung and Hsieh (2001) seven-factor (“FH7”) alpha. Annualized, this
spread is approximately 3.7 percentage points (“p.p.”) of FH7 alpha.
Our results provide evidence that investors make smarter allocation decisions to funds
that publicly disclose their holdings. We document a potential benefit of hedge fund portfolio
disclosure. In comparison, Shi (2017) finds that hedge fund performance among 13F filers
is about 4.6 p.p. lower than among non-filers.9 Her results show an average level-shift down
in fund performance, which ultimately reduces the returns enjoyed by investors. Our results
demonstrate a change in slope; investors are better able to choose the good funds, and avoid
the bad funds.
However, our smart money portfolio is not investible, and thus, we cannot claim this
benefit accrues to the average investor. To more precisely measure the impact of disclosure
on investors’ fund selection ability, we take advantage of our staggered panel data structure
to estimate longitudinal changes in the smart money effect. Our variable of interest is the
“smartness” of fund flows, that is, the beta coefficient on a regression of future performance
on past fund flows. We are interested in how the slope of this relationship changes after a
fund becomes a 13F filer. This can be thought of as a standard panel diff-in-diff where the
post indicator is interacted with fund flows. In particular, our specification is similar to Lel
9See Panel B of Table 2 in Shi (2017).
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and Miller (2015) and Jayaraman and Wu (2018), who also study the effect of a staggered
treatment on a slope, but in a corporate finance setting.
In our regression setting, we verify that the smart money effect increases after a fund
starts filing Form 13F. We address endogeneity concerns by verifying the result holds in a
regression discontinuity (“RD”) analysis and in a placebo test using fund-of-hedge funds
(“FoFs”). We also estimate specifications that use alternative measures of performance,
alternative sub-samples, and alternative sets of control variables. Our results remain robust
in each test. In our RD analysis, after a fund starts filing, an additional 10 p.p. of fund flows
predicts 1.93 p.p. higher future annualized FH7 alpha. This compares with with an average
decrease in FH7 alpha of 2.7 p.p. annually, documented by Shi (2017).10
Furthermore, our cross-sectional tests provide evidence that the increase in smart money
is due to the information content of portfolio disclosure. We find that the smart money effect
is driven by cases where: (1) the information about a fund’s portfolio holdings is more precise,
i.e., when the fund belongs to a single-fund firm or when the fund is the largest one among
those managed by the firm; (2) investors have more opportunity to use the information,
i.e., when the fund imposes less restrictions on redemptions and/or subscriptions; and (3)
information is more frequently viewed. Taken together, these results provide evidence that
investors use the information disclosed in 13F filings to evaluate fund managers, and that
this improves their fund selections.
We additionally supplement our fund-level flow-based analysis with an investor-level
holdings-based analysis. Conceptually, our within-investor analysis controls for investor-level
fixed effects. Our analysis asks, for a given investor, does their portfolio of 13F-filing hedge
funds perform better than their portfolio of non-filers? Investor-level hedge fund portfolios
are available for a small subset of investors. We have portfolio holdings for 127 registered
FoFs.11
10See Column 3 of Table 3 in Shi (2017).
11There are a small number of FoFs who are registered with the SEC, and are required to disclose their
portfolio holding on a quarterly basis via SEC Form N-Q, N-CSR, and N-CSRS. See Aiken, Clifford, and
Ellis (2013), Agarwal, Aragon, and Shi (2018a), Gao, Haight, and Yin (2019) and Sialm, Sun, and Zheng
4
For each FoF, we form two value-weighted portfolios rebalanced quarterly, consisting of
13F-filing hedge funds and non-filing hedge funds. We find that the average FoF earns 6.49
p.p. annually on its portfolio of filers, versus 5.52 p.p. annually on its portfolio of non-filers,
for a spread of 0.97 percentage points. This result provides evidence that FoFs make smarter
allocations in the universe of 13F-filing hedge funds. By controlling for investor specific
characteristics (e.g., sophistication), this result provides evidence against the possibility that
our main results might be driven by a clientele effect (e.g., smarter investors just happen to
choose among 13F filers for reasons unrelated to the information channel). Our investor-level
analysis helps rule out this reverse-causality story.
Our paper contributes to the cost-benefit analysis of 13F portfolio disclosure. The extant
literature has largely found evidence that disclosure impairs the ability of fund managers to
utilize their proprietary information,12 leading to lower returns for their clients. Shi (2017)
documents that hedge fund performance drops by 2.7 p.p. annually following disclosure.
Brown and Schwarz (2013) and Cao et al. (2018) document evidence of copycat trading, and
Cao et al. (2018) finds that the existence of one copycat decreases target fund performance
by 2.56 p.p. annually. These costs represent a level-shift down in performance, whereas our
benefits describe an increase in the selection ability of investors.
Our results, by demonstrating that investors make smarter decisions, provide a counter-
balance to the documented costs of public disclosure, and has potential general equilibrium
implications.13 For example, if a decrease in returns were the only effect, then we might
expect to see that disclosure is negatively related to price efficiency in public markets, as it
dilutes the incentives for asset managers to collect and process information. However, our
documented increase in the smartness of money can potentially offset the decrease in price
efficiency. Disclosure helps investors source better hedge fund managers, which implies that
(2019) for examples of recent work that uses portfolio data from registered FoFs.
12Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2013) and Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) demonstrate that 13F
filings may contain proprietary information. They demonstrate that hedge funds earn higher returns when
they can avoid public disclosure.
13See Cochrane (2014) for a discussion of the general equilibrium challenges of drawing inferences from
the cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation.
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informed managers receive more capital. As the efficiency of asset prices is linked to the
efficiency of the asset management market (Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2018), the total effect
of public disclosure on price efficiency is thus ambiguous.
This cost-benefit analysis is important for understanding the effect of portfolio disclosure
on economic welfare and, in particular, whether this is “good for society” (Shiller, 2013; Zin-
gales, 2015). In the hedge fund market, the client base has shifted from wealthy individuals
to large institutional investors. Institutional investors now comprise about 85% of all hedge
fund clients. These investors manage the pension plans, insurance claims, and endowments
of a society. If regulation can help these institutional investors choose better hedge fund
managers, then this is potentially a large gain to the wealth portfolio of a wide cross-section
of society.
Finally, we add to the body of literature that studies the selection ability of registered
FoFs. Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015) find limited evidence that FoFs exhibit skill when
“hiring” hedge funds, but strong evidence that FoFs make skillful “firing” decisions. Fur-
thermore, Gao et al. (2019) find that FoFs exhibit skill when rebalancing their portfolios.
Our results shed light a potential source of such skill, by documenting that FoFs earn higher
returns from their investments in 13F-filing hedge funds. More recently, Sialm et al. (2019)
find evidence that FoFs have an informational advantage in assessing the prospects of nearby
hedge funds. Relatedly, in a subsample analysis we find evidence that FoFs benefit more
from 13F disclosure when assesing geographically distant hedge funds.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional
details, data, and variable construction; Section 3 provides the portfolio-based analysis and
the difference-in-difference analysis; Section 4 presents our cross-sectional analysis of in-
formation content; Section 5 presents holdings-based analysis using FoFs; and Section 6
concludes.
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2 Institutional Detail, Data, and Variable Construc-
tion
2.1 Institutional Details
2.1.1 A Brief History of Section 13(f)
Since 1978, large institutional investment managers14 have been required to report the de-
tails of equity holdings under their discretion to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”).15 This requirement was mandated by section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”), which was enacted primarily to create a centralized dataset of
the investment activities of institutional managers. This data was intended for regulators
and the public to study the influence and impact of institutional managers on the securities
markets. As an unintented consequence, Form 13F quickly became an important tool for
investors to evaluate the performance of investment managers.
In the 1960s, the public became increasingly concerned about the role of institutional
investors contributing the speculative atmosphere of the securities markets.16 This was in
part due to the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets. In 1960,
institutional investment managers accounted for about 20% of all trading activity on the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).17 By 1966, this figure had more than doubled to 43%,18
and by the early 1970s, Jensen (1976) estimates this may have grown to 67% of all trading
on the NYSE.
In 1968, the United States Congress directed the SEC to study the effect of institutional
investors on financial markets. In March 1971, the SEC published the results in its In-
14Including banks, investment companies, pension funds, insurance companies, and brokerage houses.
15Lemke and Lins (1987) provide an excellent discussion of the history and background leading up to the
enactment of section 13(f).
16Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. XXXI-XXXIII (1971)
17See Staff of House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Restructuring Financial
Markets: The Major Policy Issues 269 (Comm. Print 1986)
18See Biel, Why Institutional Investors Control the Stock Market’s Future Course, Comm. & Fin. July
27, 1967, at 1, 24.
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stitutional Study.19 The Institutional Study did not find evidence that large institutional
investors harmed market efficiency. However, it noted the difficulties it encountered in con-
ducting the study, and recommended the 1934 Act be amended to give the SEC authority
to require disclosure of holdings and transactions data.
On June 4, 1975, Congress enacted section 13(f) as part of the Securities Act Amendments
of 1975.20 The legislative history of the act sheds light on the intended impact of section
13(f). When considering the proposal, the Senate noted:
Perhaps the most important justification for the information collection program
which this bill would authorize is the need to collect and disseminate to indi-
vidual investors data about institutional investment managers. Many people
believe that it is not possible to make informed investment decisions on a secu-
rity without information related to the likely market activity and the degree of
institutional concentration in the security. ... [W]hat is important is that in-
formation about the securities holdings and certain transactions of institutional
managers be available to all investors - both institutional and individual - so that
they can all have it, whatever its relative usefulness in making their independent
judgments. Thus, with the dissemination of data about institutional managers,
an institutional disclosure program should stimulate a higher degree of confidence
among all investors in the integrity of our securities markets.21
While the stated intent of the disclosure requirement is to increase the transparency of
large influential institutional investors, market participants quickly learned that the infor-
mation reported on 13F could be used to evaluate investment managers. By 1987, various
publications regularly published evaluations and ratings of managers based on data collected
from 13F filings (Lemke and Lins, 1987).
19Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. XXXI-XXXIII (1971)
20Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 119 (1975)
21Report of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
85 (1975)
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The use of section 13(f) portfolio disclosures was not originally intended to be used by
the investing public to evaluate portfolio managers. Furthermore, since 2011 private fund
managers (including hedge fund managers) have been required to report position-level data
regularly with the SEC on Form PF. The original intent of section 13(f) was to allow the
SEC to monitor the behavior of large institutional investors. Hedge funds are now required
to privately report much more detailed data directly to the government through Form PF.
2.1.2 Form 13F Filing Requirements
Currently, institutional investment managers are required to file Form 13F on a quarterly
basis. The obligation to file is triggered whenever the management company has discretion
over assets totaling at least $100 million. Specifically, in a particular calendar year, if the
assets of a management company are above the $100 million threshold as of the last trading
day of any month, then the firm will be required to file Form 13F starting as of December
31st. It will subsequently file as of March 31st, June 30th, and September 30th, regardless
of the current value of assets under management.
The investment manager is required to report a schedule of investments, which includes:
(1) the name of the issuer; (2) the title and class of the security; (3) the CUSIP number
of the security; (4) the fair market value of the holding, using the value on the last trading
day of the quarter; (5) the total number of shares held; (6) whether the manager has sole or
shared discretion over the assets; (7) a list of the other managers that have discretion over
this asset holding; and (8) whether the manager has sole, shared, or no voting authority over
the shares held.
The $100 million asset threshold described above is based on the company’s holdings
of section 13(f) securities. Section 13(d)(1) describes which types of equity securities are
required to be considered. However, Rule 13(f)(1) effectively limits this set to only those
equities that trade on a national securities exchange or are quoted on the NASDAQ.
Firms are required to report their long position of section 13(f) securities, and their
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option positions where the underlying security is a section 13(f) security. Generally, short
equity positions and bond positions are not reported. Foreign equity positions are also not
included.
A key difficulty in our analysis is that 13F filings are made at the management company
level. Form 13F aggregates the total long positions across the entire firm. If a management
company only offers one hedge fund product, then its Form 13F will reflect the asset holding
of that hedge fund product. However, if the management company offers multiple hedge
fund products, or a mix of hedge fund and mutual fund products, then its Form 13F will be
reported at the aggregate company level, and we will not be able to back out the holdings of
individual funds. In our sample, about 42% of observations are from single-fund companies,
where we (and investors) can directly observe the assets of the underlying fund.
2.2 Data and Variable Construction
2.2.1 Sample Selection
Our sample of hedge funds comes from the Thompson Reuters Lipper TASS database.
For each listed fund, the database provides monthly net-of-fee returns and assets-under-
management (“AUM”), a snapshot of characteristics, and the name of the parent manage-
ment company. As of December 2016, TASS contains a total of 20,094 live and graveyard
funds. Following prior literature,22 we require our sample of funds to: report monthly, report
returns and AUM denominated in U.S. dollars, report returns net-of-fees, and list a hedge
fund style. We also remove observations before 1994 in order to control for survivorship bias.
To control for backfill bias, we further exclude the first eighteen months of returns for each
fund. To estimate alphas, we also require at least twenty-four months of return observations.
Next, we only include funds that report a management company, otherwise we cannot link
these firms to Form 13F. We then drop FoFs, as these do not hold equity positions. Finally,
22In particular, we follow the cleaning guides recommended by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014)
and Getmansky, Lee, and Lo (2015a).
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we follow Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) and correct for master-feeder duplicates, resulting in
a sample of 4,398 unique hedge funds managed by 2,600 management firms.
We next identify whether a hedge fund belongs to an parent company that is subject to
13F reporting requirements. Quarterly 13F reports are filed with the SEC and are publicly
available on the EDGAR system. We obtain the full list of corporate filings from the EDGAR
index files as of June 2017.23 We focus on the subset of companies that have filed at least
one 13F report, and match them with the list of management firms in TASS.24 A fund-
quarter observation is defined as “filer” if investor (i.e., the public) has access to at least one
13F report at the beginning of the quarter. Because the first batch of 13F filings available
in EDGAR index files is filed during the second quarter of 1999, our sample starts in the
third quarter of 1999.25 Following Shi (2017), we exclude observations after a fund’s very
last 13F report; we also exclude the two fund-quarter observations around the first ever
13F report (namely, the last “non-filer” quarter and the first “filer” quarter) in our main
analysis.26 Finally, to be included in the sample, an observation must have non-missing
fund characteristics, including fund flow, lagged fund size, fund age, lagged fund flow, lagged
fund return, and return volatility. Our main sample consists of 2,824 funds from 1,775
management firms, among which 325 funds (from 226 management firms) changed filing
status from non-13F filer to 13F filer in the sample period (“switchers”).27 These switching
23The index files can be found here: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/.
24Throughout the paper, we consider the following SEC form types to be 13F report: 13F-E, 13F-E/A,
13F-HR, 13F-HR/A, 13F-NT, 13F-NT/A, 13FCONP, and 13FCONP/A.
25On January 12, 1999, the SEC adopted a rule requiring Form 13F reports to be filed in electronic format
(effective on April 1, 1999). Filers must submit Form 13F electronically, unless a hardship exemption is
available. See Release No. 34-40934 (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40934.htm). This is reflected
in the EDGAR index files, there are 100, 180, 2,165, and 2,346 13F reports filed during 1998Q4, 1999Q1,
1999Q2, and 1999Q3, respectively.
26Note that our definition of “filer” is based on whether investors have access to the fund’s 13F report at
the beginning of a quarter, we exclude the last “non-filer” quarter because fund flows during this quarter may
or may not be related to the 13F report; we exclude the first “filer” quarter because investors typically need
two 13F reports to reconcile a fund’s performance with the changes in its portfolio holdings. Nevertheless,
as a robustness check, our results remain when we include these dropped observations (reported in Panel B
of Table 7).
27There are 676 funds (from 375 management firms) that were 13F filers at the start of the sample period
(“always-filers”), and 1,823 funds (from 1280 management firms) that never filed 13F at any point up to the
end of the sample period (“never-filers”).
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funds form our treatment group, and the remaining funds act as our control group. The
sample period is from 1999Q3 to 2016Q3. On average, 32.8% of observations in each quarter
come from 13F filers, the figure ranges from 21.3% at the beginning of the sample period to
36.5% at the end of the sample period.
2.2.2 Variable Construction
To study the smart money effect, we follow the literature (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri
and Tufano, 1998) and calculate quarterly fund flow as:
Flowi,t =
AUMi,t − AUMi,t−3(1 +Ri,t−3:t)
AUMi,t−3
, (1)
where Flowi,t is the percent fund flow for fund i at time t over the past three months, AUMi,t
is the assets-under-management of fund i at time t, and Ri,t−3:t is the net-of-fee return of
fund i from time t− 3 to time t.
We evaluate hedge fund performance using monthly net-of-fee returns reported in TASS.
In our main analysis, we consider three performance measures: excess return, Fung and
Hsieh (2001) seven-factor alpha (“FH7”), and the alpha from the Fung and Hsieh (2001)
seven-factor model extended to include the momentum factor (“FH8”). Following Agarwal,
Green, and Ren (2018b), we first calculate monthly alphas. Specifically, at the end of each
month, we first estimate factor loadings using return observations from the past 24 months
(i.e., month t− 23 to t) and the following factor model:
ri,t − rf,t = αi +
K∑
k=1
βki F
k
t + εi,t (2)
where ri,t is the return of fund i in month t, rf,t is the risk-free rate in month t, αi is the
performance measure of fund i over the regression period, βki is the factor loading of the
returns of fund i on factor k during the regression period, F kt is the return for factor k in
month t , and εi,t is the error term of fund i in month t. Then we calculate alpha based on the
12
loadings for month t+ 1, t+ 2, and t+ 3. Finally we compound these monthly alphas to get
quarterly alpha. The Fung and Hsieh (2001) seven factors are: (1) S&P 500 returns minus
the risk-free rate (S&P 500); (2) Wilshire small-cap 1,750 returns minus Wilshire large-cap
750 returns (SC-LC); (3) changes in the constant maturity yield of the ten-year Treasury
bond; (4) changes in the spread of Moodys Baa minus the ten- year Treasury bond; (5) the
bond trendfollowing factor (PTFSBD); (6) the currency trendfollowing factor (PTFSFX);
and (7) the commodity trendfollowing factor (PTFSCOM).28 In the case of FH8 alpha, we
obtain the momentum factor from Kenneth R. French’s website.29 As a robustness check, we
also use alternative performance measures, including the market model (CAPM), the Fama
and French (1992) three-factor model (FF3), and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The
results are shown in Panel A of Table 7.
2.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our main sample of hedge funds between 1999Q3
and 2016Q3.
[Table 1 here]
Flow is the quarterly flow during each calendar quarter. Excess Return, FH7 Alpha, and
FH8 Alpha are quarterly compounded performance measures. Fund Size is the fund assets
under management at each quarter end. Fund Age is the number of months since fund
inception. Return Volatility is the return volatility using fund returns between month t− 11
and t. Across all funds and all quarters, the mean (median) fund flow is -0.27% (-0.179%)
with a standard deviation of 18.35; the mean (median) FH7 alpha is 0.766% (0.522%) with
a standard deviation of 9.417; the mean (median) fund size is $218 million ($54 million)
with a standard deviation of $825.14 million; the mean (median) fund age is 104 months (89
months) with a standard deviation of 54.76 months; and the mean (median) return volatility
28The bond, currency, and commodity trendfollowing factors are directly downloaded from David A.
Hsiehs data library: https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. The other four factors are
constructed following the methods in Fung and Hsieh (2001).
29See: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/Faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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is 11.26% (8.52%) with a standard deviation of 9.92%.
An assumption in the difference-in-difference estimation is that the treatment and control
group of funds follow similar patterns prior to the event (i.e., the filing status change from
non-13F filer to 13F filer). We examine the validity of this parallel trends assumption by
comparing the sensitivity of fund returns to fund flows in the 3 quarters prior to the filing
status change, for the treatment group compared to the control group.
The treatment sample includes those firms that cross the filing threshold (and start filing
13F) during the sample period from 1999Q3 and 2016Q3. The control sample includes those
firms that either never file, or always file, throughout our sample period. For each fund i
in the treatment group, we identify the first quarter q that it becomes a 13F filer. Next,
we match fund i with all funds in the control group at quarter q. We then consider the
observations for fund i and its control group at quarters q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3. We then
estimate the following cross-sectional regression for the treatment and control groups, for
each of the three quarters leading up to the filing event:
Excess Returni,q+1 = α + β1Flowi,q + β2LogSizei,q−1 + εi,q (3)
The coefficients (β1) capture the sensitivity of fund return to fund flow prior to the filing
status change.
[Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 illustrates that we observe similar patterns in this sensitivity between funds that
change their filing status and those in the control group, supporting the existence of parallel
trends.
3 13F Filings and Smart Money
Following Shi (2017), we study the effect of portfolio disclosure on the informational content
of investor flows using (1) a univariate portfolio analysis, and (2) a difference-in-differences
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estimation.
3.1 Portfolio Sorts
We first study whether investors make better decisions when investing in 13F-filing funds.
We proxy for investor decisions using net fund flows at the fund level. We conjecture that
high fund flows reflect investor expectations that returns will be high, and low fund flows
reflect expectations that returns will be low. If investors can predict future performance,
then the spread in performance between high-flow and low-flow funds will be positive. This
spread captures the smart money effect.
If, on average, the spread is higher for 13F-filing funds, compared to non-13F filers, then
this provides evidence that investors, in aggregate, have more information about 13F-filing
funds compared to non-13F-filing funds.
Table 2 reports this portfolio-based analysis. At end of each calendar quarter q, we
consider all hedge funds in our sample. We first sort these funds into two groups based on
current filing status: filers and non-filers. Within each group, funds are then sorted into
four quartiles based on fund flows in quarter q. Value-weighted portfolios are formed within
each quartile, and are rebalanced every quarter. We exclude fund-quarters after a fund has
stopped filing Form 13F, and we also exclude the two fund-quarters around the switching
event (i.e., one quarter before and after the first ever 13F filing).
[Table 2 here]
In each panel of Table 2, the first four columns report the monthly performance for the
four portfolios sorted on past fund flows. The fifth column, High-Low, presents the spread in
average performance between the high-flow and low-flow funds. In each panel, the first row
presents the portfolio returns for non-filing funds, the second row presents portfolio returns
for filing funds, and the third row presents the difference between filer and non-filer returns.
Panel A presents excess returns, Panel B reports Fung and Hsieh (2001) seven-factor
(“FH7”) alphas, and Panel C reports alphas based on the Fung and Hsieh (2001) model
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extended to include momentum (“FH8”). In each panel, the bottom right value represents
the difference in the high-minus-low spread between filers and non-filers. The difference in
the spread is positive and significant (at the 5% level) in all three specifications. Measured
in terms of excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha, the monthly difference in spreads are
34.1 bps, 30.5 bps, and 28.6 bps, respectively.
These monthly differences correspond to annual differences of about 4.2% of excess re-
turns, and 3.7% of FH7 alpha. This contrasts with the decrease in average returns doc-
umented by Shi (2017) of between 3% and 4% of FH7 alpha after a fund becomes a 13F
filers. Together, these results suggest that when a fund becomes a 13F filer its performance
decreases, however some investors may be made better off on net.
3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation - Main Regression
The portfolio tests provide evidence that some investors earn higher returns after a fund
starts filing Form 13F. We next provide evidence of the causal effect of portfolio disclosure
on informed investing by studying whether flows become smarter after a fund becomes a
filer. We employ a difference-in-differences analysis that compares the difference in the
smart money effect before and after disclosure with that of a control group in the same time
period.
Conceptually, our approach regresses future performance on hedge fund flows.
Performancei,q+t = α + βFlowi,q + εi,q (4)
The smart money effect is captured by the beta in the above regression. It measures whether
past investor flows are able to predict future hedge fund performance.
We study how the smart money effect (beta) changes after a hedge fund starts filing
Form 13F. To study how this slope change, we employ a difference-in-differences research
design based on Lel and Miller (2015). We use the following panel regression framework with
16
fixed-effects:
Performancei,q+t = αi + αq + βFlowi,q × Treatmenti × Posti,q + Controlsi,q + εi,q (5)
where our treatment group are funds that will file Form 13F at some point of the sample,
and our post event is whether the fund has already started filing Form 13F. We interact
the treatment and post variables with past fund flows, and study whether the smart money
effect (beta) between flows and future performance is different for treated funds after the
event.
The full regression specification is:
Performancei,q+t = αi + αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi × Posti,q (6)
+ β213Fi × Posti,q + β3Flowi,q × Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi
+ β5Flowi,q + β613Fi + β7Posti,q
+ γControlsi,q + εi,q
Performancei,q+t is the quarterly compounded performance from quarter q to quarter q+ t.
Performance is measured as (1) excess returns, (2) alpha from the FH7 model, and (3) alpha
from the FH8 model. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files form 13F, and is
equivalent to Treatmenti in equation 5. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has filed
form 13F prior to quarter q. Flowi,q is the quarterly fund flow in quarter q. Control variables
include log fund size (or the linear and quadratic terms of fund size), log fund age, average
quarterly fund flows in quarters q − 3, q − 2, and q − 1, average quarterly returns in the
previous four quarters, and the volatility of past 12-month returns. αi are fund-level fixed
effects and control for time-invariant omitted fund characteristics, such as manager skill.
αq are time fixed effects and account for time-varying factors that affect all funds, such as
macroeconomic trends or trends in hedge fund performance. Standard errors are clustered
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at the management company level.
Consistent with Shi (2017), we exclude fund-quarters after the firm stops filing Form
13F. We exclude the fund-quarter before the first filing event, because we are unsure whether
flows are due to the time before or after the filing. We also exclude the the first fund-quarter
observation after the first filing because we conjecture that the value of portfolio disclosure
comes from analyzing portfolio changes. In robustness tests, we demonstrate that our results
hold if we do not make these exclusions.
As discussed in Lel and Miller (2015), several terms in this specification are redundant
and will be dropped. The 13Fi term is equal to one for all funds that ever file form 13F, in
the presence of fund-level fixed effects, this term is redundant. Similarly, the variable Posti,q
is equal to one for all quarters after fund i begins filing form 13F. That is, this variable is
only equal to one for 13F filers, and is thus equal to 13Fi × Posti,q. We thus drop terms
containing the former. We can then rewrite our regression specification as:
Performancei,q+t = αi + αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi × Posti,q (7)
+ β213Fi × Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi + β5Flowi,q
+ γControlsi,q + εi,q
This specification allows us to study how the smart-money effect changes after a fund
becomes a filer (captured by β1), controlling for the fact that the smart money effect might be
different for filers compared to non-filers. Throughout our regression analyses, the variables
are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% level to remove the influence of outliers.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 reports the regression results for equation (7) using performance measures in
quarter q + 1. The dependent variable is excess returns in Columns 1, 2, and 3; FH7 alpha
is Columns 4, 5, and 6; and FH8 alpha in Columns 7, 8, and 9. Columns 4, 6, and 9 report
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the full specification from equation 7. In each case, the coefficient on our variable of interest,
i.e., the beta on Flow× 13F ×Post, is positive and significant at the 5% level. After a fund
starts filing Form 13F, the increase in the smart money effect is 0.025, 0.019, and 0.023 in the
excess return, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha specifications, respectively. The interquartile range
of flows (from Table 1) is 8.69, thus the impact on annual performance for an interquartile
increase in flows for filers vs. non-filers is 87 bps, 66 bps, and 80 bps for excess returns, FH7
alpha, and FH8 alpha respectively.
These economic magnitudes are smaller than the estimates from the portfolio analysis,
but are still positive and significant. The portfolio analysis was conducted with value-
weighted returns, and thus may better capture the dollar increase in value.
3.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimation - RDD
The diff-in-diff analysis of the previous section uses the entire (cleaned) time-series of data
available for each fund. One issue is that funds above the threshold might simply be better
funds. For example, they might be more forthcoming with information, which helps investors
make better decisions. Funds far from the cutoff may be materially different from funds close
to the cutoff, and this difference may not be fully captured by covariates.
We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to limit the unintended effect of these
large management companies. To ensure that we are not simply capturing the effect of
total value of 13(f) securities at the management company (as opposed to the effect of
mandatory portfolio disclosure), we repeat our baseline regression using only funds managed
by management companies around the $100 million threshold. Since we cannot observe
the value of 13(f) securities for non-filers, we use the following two methods to restrict our
sample: (i) for funds that experience a filing status switch (i.e., from non-filing to filing), we
restrict the sample to those fund-quarter observations around the filing status change. In
practice, we restrict the sample to the four-year window centered around its first ever 13F
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filing; in doing so, the total value of 13(f) securities should be around $100 million.30 and
(ii) following Shi (2017), we restrict the sample based on the fund company AUM reported
in TASS. Specifically, for our full regression sample, we only keep fund-quarter observations
where the TASS company AUMs are between 50 million and 300 million.
[Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the RDD analysis. We repeat the baseline regression analysis (equation 7)
for subsamples (i) and (ii). Subsample (i) is reported in Columns 1, 2, and 3, and subsample
(ii) is reported in Columns 4, 5, and 6. Here we find that our coefficient of interest increases
in the RDD analysis across all specifications. For example, Column 9 of Table 3 corresponds
to Column 6 of Table 4. Here we see the coefficient increases from 0.023 to 0.048. In terms
of economic magnitude, an interquartile increase in flows leads to a 167 bps increase in FH8
alpha (for filers vs. non-filers), this compares to 80 bps increase reported in the baseline
specification.
3.4 Placebo Test
Another issue with our identification strategy is that better firms may endogenously cross the
threshold. Better firms attract more capital, and will be more likely to cross the threshold.
Even in the RDD setting, we still might have a difference in quality in firms above and below
the threshold.
We address this issue by conducting a placebo test. We redo the main analysis of equation
7 using only FoFs. FoFs are hedge funds that invest in other hedge funds. They typically do
not invest in 13(f) securities, and as such, the information revealed on their parent company’s
13F filing should be minimal.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 reports the estimates of the placebo regressions. This repeats the analysis pre-
30Note that since we only use funds that have ever changed filing status, the term 13F would always be
1, therefore Flow× 13F would take the same value as Flow. In light of this, we drop the term Flow× 13F
when reporting the regression results.
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sented in Table 3, except only using FoFs. Here, the coefficient on our variable of interest
(Flow× 13F × Post) is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but never significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Thus, this provides us with evidence that our results are results are not
spurious.
3.5 Difference-in-Differences Estimation - Persistence
Our results provide evidence that the smartness of money increases after a fund starts filing
Form 13F. However, our outcome variable so far is short-term – it is only one quarter into
the future. The average redemption period for a hedge fund is about 100 days (Getmansky
et al., 2015b), which is longer than a quarter. In this section, we test the persistence of the
smart money effect, to see whether the effect reverses before investors can redeem.
[Table 6 here]
We repeat the baseline specification (equation 7) but replace performance one quarter
into the future with performance two quarters, three quarters, and four quarters into the
future. The results are presented in Table 6. Here, we find some evidence that smart money
is persistent. In particular, it seems the 13F-induced smart money effect is persistent at
a horizon of two quarters when performance is measured in terms of FH7 alpha and FH8
alpha.
More importantly, we do not find evidence that the 13F-induced smart money effect
reverses in the year following the investment decision.
3.6 Robustness
We next investigate the robustness of our results through a series of tests. The first set of
tests studies alternative measures of performance and alternative samples. The second set
of tests expand the set of control variables.
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3.6.1 Alternative Measures and Samples
Table 7 reports the results from robustness tests that use alternative measures of performance
and alternative samples of the data.
[Table 7 here]
Columns 1, 2, and 3 estimate our main regression specification (equation 7) using CAPM
alpha, Fama and French (1992) 3-factor alpha, and Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha, respec-
tively. The effect of these alphas should be absorbed in our specification by the FH7 and
FH8 alpha. Indeed, we see that while the main effect decreases slightly, it remains positive
and significant.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 report regressions results for the full sample. Recall, in our main
specification we drop fund-quarter observations (i) after the firm stops filing Form 13F, and
(ii) in the quarter directly before and after the fund becomes a filer. In these tests, we include
those dropped observations. We find that the main effect remains positive and significant.
We next limit our analysis to the subset of firms that eventually file Form 13F. This
addresses the concern that the control group might consist of funds that are fundamentally
different from the firms that become filers. Columns 7, 8, and 9 repeat our main analysis
(equation 7) using only fund-quarters observations from funds that experience filing status
change during the sample period (i.e., from non-13F filer to 13F filer). We further restrict the
sample so that a given fund has at least one observation before- and one observation after-
the status change. In this regression, the variable 13Fi is equal to one for all observations,
thus the term Flow × 13F drops out of the regression. The baseline result remains positive
and significant in this subsample. In Columns 10, 11, and 12, we estimate our baseline
regression model using only funds that never filed 13F as control group. This is similar to
the restriction imposed by Lel and Miller (2015) on their sample.
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3.6.2 Additional Controls
We next extend the baseline analysis to include additional control variables. We include
(i) observable fund-level variables, and (ii) unobservable company-level fixed effects. Our
baseline specification includes fund-level fixed effects, thus we expect the additional fund-
level controls will have a minimal impact.
Table 8 reports the results from extending our analysis to include observable fund-level
characteristics, and company fixed-effects (to control for unobservable company characteris-
tics).
[Table 8 here]
In Columns 1, 2, and 3, we estimate our baseline regression model including time-invariant
fund-level characteristics. The additional controls variables include the following: redemp-
tion notice period, measured in units of 30 days (RedemptionNotice); lockup period (LockUp);
management fee (MgmtFee); incentive fee (IncentiveFee); the log of one plus minimum in-
vestment (MinInvestment); indicator variables for: whether personal capital is committed
(PersonalCapital); whether there is a high water mark provision (HWM ); whether the fund
uses leverage (Leveraged); and whether the fund is offshore (Offshore). Because these con-
trols are fund-level time-invariant, we include style fixed-effects instead of fund fixed-effects;
also note that in absence of fund fixed-effects, the stand alone term 13F is added back to
the regression specifications. Here we see that after controlling for observable fund-level
characteristics, the coefficient on the triple-interaction term remains positive and significant.
We next include company fixed-effects to control for unobservable time-invariant proper-
ties that may affect the funds. In columns 4, 5, and 6, we estimate the regression model with
firm controls and company fixed-effects. Note that after including company fixed-effects,
the stand-alone term 13F is again redundant. Here we again see that the coefficient on the
triple-interaction term remains positive and significant.
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4 Cross-Sectional Analysis
To shed light on the economic mechanisms that drive our results, we next explore the rich
cross-sectional heterogeneity among sample hedge funds. We look at how variation in the
informational content and usefulness of 13F filings relates to the smart money effect. We
find that the smart money effect increases when information is more precise, when it can be
used more freely, and when investors pay more attention to it.
These results also provide evidence against the alternative story that there exists a
smarter set of investors who are restricted to investing only in 13F-filing funds. If this
were the case, then we should expect to see an increase in smart money, even when 13F
filings do not provide much incremental information.
4.1 Disclosure Fraction
Our first set of tests study the informational content of 13F filings. Form 13F is filed at
the company level. It reports the aggregate long-positions of all the firm’s hedge fund and
mutual fund products. Our analysis, however, is conducted at the fund level. For a given
fund, if it is the only fund offered by its management company, then the company’s 13F
filing will reveal the fund’s entire long position. If, on the other hand, the fund belongs to
a mutli-fund company, then the fund’s long positions will be obfuscated with those of its
sibling funds. Thus, we expect the informational content of a 13F filing should be higher
when the fund comes from a single-fund family, as opposed to a mutli-fund family.
We expect to find stronger results if investors have more precise information. We split
the sample in the following three ways: (i) based on whether the fund is from a single-fund
company or a multi-fund company; (ii) based on whether a fund is the largest fund within
a fund company; and (iii) based on whether the proportion of its portfolio reveled in 13F is
above or below the cross-sectional median.31
31Specifically, for each quarter, we split the sample based on the ratio of fund assets to the total assets of
its management company (i.e., fund AUM divided by company AUM).
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[Table 9 here]
Table 9 reports the results of these cross-sectional tests. The dependent variable (per-
formance) is measured as the quarterly FH7 alpha. Columns 1 and 2 report the results
of method (i); Columns 3 and 4 report the results of method (ii); and Columns 5 and 6
report the results of method (iii). Here, we see that the effect is driven by the funds with
more precise information in 13F. In each of the odd-numbered columns, the coefficient on
the triple interaction term is positive and significant; in each of the even-numbered columns,
the coefficient is positive but insignificant. These results demonstrate that the smart money
effect is stronger when investors have more precise information.
4.2 Mobility of Capital
Our next set of tests study whether the smart money effect is related to the ease of which an
investor can get in and out of a fund. The information contained in Form 13F is only of value
if investors can actually use it. If there are restrictions on redemptions or subscriptions, then
we expect the information will be less useful. That is, we expect the smart money effect will
increase by more when money can freely enter or exit a fund.
To investigate this, we split the sample based on the following fund characteristics: (i)
whether a fund has lock-up provision; (ii) the redemption frequency; (iii) the length of the
redemption notice period; and (iv) the subscription frequency.32
[Table 10 here]
Table 10 reports the results of the mobility tests. The dependent variable (performance)
is measured as the quarterly FH7 alpha. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of method (i);
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of method (ii); Columns 5 and 6 report the results of
method (iii); and Columns 7 and 8 report the results of method (iv). The odd-numbered
columns represent the subsample of firms with less restrictions on the movement of investor
32Since our main analysis is conducted at a quarterly frequency, we split the sample around the 3-month
mark (for ii, iii, and iv). Funds with a frequency or period less (greater) than three months are grouped into
the “short”(“long”) bin.
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capital. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive and significant across all the
odd-numbered columns, while positive and insignificant across the even-numbered columns
(those with more restrictions on investor capital). These results demonstrate that money is
smarter when information can be used more freely.
4.3 Investor Attention
We next investigate cross-sectional differences in how investors access information. We con-
jecture that when more investors view 13F filings, the smart money effect will be stronger.
We use the EDGAR log files to measure when potential investors access 13F filings.33 One
caveat is that this measure will also pick up the activity of copycat traders. This introduces
noise to our measure, but because copycat trading is not related to the smart money ef-
fect, this noise should bias us away from finding a relationship between attention and smart
money.
We split the sample based on investor attention.34 For a given fund-quarter, we calculate
the number of downloads of 13F reports that are available at the beginning of the quarter
as the proportion of requests made on all available 13F reports in EDGAR during the same
quarter.35 Then, for a given fund, we average the measure across all quarters to get the
fund-level investor attention measure. Finally, we split the sample based on the median
value of investor attention.
33Numerous studies have used this data set to measure investor attention; for example, see: Drake,
Roulstone, and Thornock (2015), Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015), and Li and Sun (2018). The EDGAR log
files data set can be found here: https://www.sec.gov/dera/data/edgar-log-file-data-set.html.
34Because “Non-filers” will automatically have zero downloads, we only include those funds that switch
from non-13F filer to 13F filer in our regression sample.
35We follow the literature to identify and drop “robot” downloads from the raw EDGAR log file. Specifi-
cally, we follow the procedure described in Li and Sun (2018): First, following Lee et al. (2015), we exclude
the searching records of those users who download more than 50 unique firms filings in one day. The user
is identified by their unique IP address. Second, following Ryans (2017) and Drake et al. (2015), we remove
log records that reference an index (i.e, idx = 1), as index pages only provide the links to filings rather than
the actual filing data. Third, following Ryans (2017), we keep the request records with successful document
delivery (i.e., code = 200). We then further exclude the search records of users who make more than 25 filing
requests per minute or more than 500 requests per day, or with more than three unique CIKs searching per
minute. Finally, we only keep one search record for a specific filing (unique accession number) to each user
in a given day.
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[Table 11 here]
Table 11 reports the results of the investor attention tests. The dependent variable
(performance) is measured as the quarterly FH7 alpha. Panel A reports the subsample
regression results described above. In Panel B, we use all EDGAR filings instead of only
13F filings (as denominator) when calculating the fund-quarter investor attention. In Panel
C and Panel D, we repeat the analyses in Panel A and Panel B using the number of unique
IP addresses instead of the number of downloads.
Across all four panels, the coefficient of interest (on Flow × 13F × Post) is positive
and significant for the high investor attention subsample (the odd-numbered columns). For
the low investor attention subsample is positive but not significant. These results provide
evidence that there is investor-relevant information contained in 13F filings, and that when
investors in aggregate access this information they make more informed investment decisions.
Our three sets of tests demonstrate that the smart money effect is stronger when investors
have more precise information, when they are less restricted in using this information, and
when more investors access information. This is consistent with investors using portfolio
disclosure to make more informed allocation decisions. It is inconsistent with the story
that smarter investors choose 13F-filing funds, because then cross-sectional differences in
information should not matter.
5 Holdings-Based Analysis
As mentioned above, one concern is that our findings may be driven by 13F-filing funds
having a different, more sophisticated investor clientele than that of non-filing funds. To
ensure that our results are not due to smart investors purchasing and selling 13F-filing
funds, rather than 13F filings making investors smart, we employ investor-level, hedge fund
portfolios, available for registered FoFs, to explore the investment decisions of a given investor
within the universe of 13F-filing versus non-filing hedge funds. Conceptually, this analysis
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can be viewed as comparing the smart money effect for 13F-filing versus non-filing hedge
funds—after controlling for investor fixed effects.
Following Gao et al. (2019), we first use answers in Form N-SAR filings to identify
potential FoFs among all registered investment companies.36 This procedure yields a sample
of 496 potential FoFs. Next, we use holdings data reported in forms N-CSR, N-CSRS, and
N-Q to exclude funds that primarily hold assets other than hedge funds. In the process,
we also drop funds that fail to raise capital (and thus report zero holdings throughout their
lifetime). Finally, we identify funds with master-feeder structures so that only master funds
are included in our sample.37 The final sample consists of 127 FoFs covering a sample period
from 2004Q3 to 2016Q4.38
We hand collect quarterly holdings data from Form N-CSR, N-CSRS, and N-Q filings for
all registered FoFs in our final sample. We then match each portfolio hedge fund with the list
of hedge fund names in TASS and Form ADV.39 Overall, we are able to match 79.06% of the
portfolio hedge funds.40 To determine whether a portfolio hedge fund-quarter observation is
“filer” or “non-filer”, we follow the same procedure described in section 2.2.41
[Table 12 here]
Table 12 presents the summary statistics of our sample of FoFs. Panel A, B, and C
reports the statistics at the end of 2004, 2010, and 2016, respectively. At the end of 2010, for
example, our sample consists of 46 FoFs; the mean (median) FoF size is $392 million ($119
million). On average, a FoF holds 31 hedge funds, of which 17 are “filer” hedge funds and
9 are “non-filer” hedge funds;42 and a FoF invests 65% and 23% of its total assets in ‘filer”
36Specifically, we first identify closed-end funds using Item 27, as FoFs commonly register as closed-end
funds. We then filter funds with minimum initial investment requirements using Item 61 of the filing.
37This is because that feeder funds normally invest 100% in their master funds.
38Our sample starts in 2004 because registered investment companies are required to file quarterly holdings
starting from 2004.
39In Section 7.B.(1) of Form ADV, registered investment advisers are required to report all private funds
that they advise.
40Among all portfolio hedge funds, 23.64% have matches in TASS and 74.96% have matches in Form ADV.
41For funds matched with Form ADV, we utilize the “legal name” reported in Item 1.A of Form ADV and
check whether it is among companies that have filed at least one 13F report.
42For the remaining 5 portfolio hedge funds that cannot be matched with either TASS or Form ADV, we do
not know their management firms/advisers and therefore are not categorized as either “filer” or “non-filer”.
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hedge funds and “non-filer” hedge funds, respectively.
Following Aiken et al. (2013), we use the following formula to generate quarterly hedge
fund returns:
Fund Returni,t =
Valuei,t − Change in Costi,(t−1,t)
Valuei,t−1
− 1, (8)
where Value is the current value of the underlying hedge fund i, and Change in Cost is the
change in cost basis in the underlying hedge fund i between two adjacent quarter-ends. In
this analysis, we focus exclusively on those returns in which cost basis does not change.43
Multiple FoFs may hold the same underlying hedge fund at the same quarter-end. In case
we cannot calculate return for a given hedge fund position (due to change in cost basis, or
cost is missing), we use the cross-sectional average returns of the same hedge fund held by all
other FoFs in the same quarter, as long as the spread between the minimum and maximum
returns is no more than 1%.44 Finally, all returns are winsorized at 1% and 99% level to
remove the influence of outliers.
5.1 Holdings-Based Analysis: Full Sample
We use a standard holdings-based analysis of the sort used in Coval and Moskowitz (2001)
and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), but we look at the performance of FoFs’ 13F-filing
hedge fund holdings (rather than local or connected holdings) compared to their non-filing
hedge fund holdings. Specifically, at the end of each calendar quarter, we assign hedge funds
in each FoF’s portfolio to one of two portfolios: 13F-filing or non-filing. We then compute
the quarterly returns on 13F-filing and non-filing holdings over the next quarter, assuming
that FoFs did not change their holdings between quarter-ends. Portfolios are rebalanced
every calendar quarter, and within a given FoF-quarter, hedge funds are value-weighted by
their value at the end of the previous quarter (i.e., 13F-filing hedge funds are value-weighted
43As noted in Aiken et al. (2013), there are discrepancies in how each FoF reports changes in cost.
Moreover, changes in cost require placing strong assumptions on the timing of cost changes throughout the
quarter.
44We use the matches with TASS and Form ADV to track the same hedge fund across different FoFs.
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in the FoF’s 13F-filing portfolio, and non-filing hedge funds are value-weighted in the FoF’s
non-filing portfolio); we then calculate the spread between the two value-weighted returns.
Finally, we average calendar time portfolios across FoFs and quarters, with standard errors
clustered at various levels.45 For a given FoF-quarter observation to be included in the
analysis, we require that (1) at least 50% of its holdings can be matched with TASS or
Form ADV (and therefore we can determine their filing statuses), (2) its 13F-filing portfolio
contains at least one 13F-filing hedge fund with valid returns, and (3) its non-filing portfolio
contains at least one non-filing hedge fund with valid returns. The final sample consists of
2,084 FoF-quarter observations from 117 FoFs, spanning 49 quarters.
In addition to examining portfolios of the FoF’s holdings, we also compute returns on the
13F-filing hedge funds that FoFs choose not to hold. Using the similar portfolio construction
approach as before, we compute equal-weighted returns on portfolios of 13F-filing hedge funds
that FoFs choose not to hold.46 For a given FoF-quarter observation to be included in the
analysis, we require that (1) at least 50% of its holdings can be matched with TASS or Form
ADV (and therefore we can determine their filing statuses), (2) its 13F-filing held portfolio
contains at least one 13F-filing hedge fund with valid returns, and (3) its 13F-filing not held
portfolio contains at least one 13-filing hedge fund with valid returns. The final sample
consists of 2,355 FoF-quarter observations from 122 FoFs, spanning 49 quarters.
[Table 13 here]
Table 13 reports our holdings-based results using entire sample of hedge funds. Panel A
presents the comparison between 13F-filing portfolio and non-filing portfolio. On average, a
FoF holds 11.2 “filer” hedge funds and 5.3 “non-filer” hedge funds. The results show that
13F-filing holdings earn 1.59% per quarter in raw returns and non-filing holdings earn 1.35%
per quarter in raw returns. The spread of the long-short portfolio is 0.23% per quarter
(or 0.92% per year), and is statistically significant at 10% level even with standard errors
45We use the following clustering methods: (1) no clustering; (2) clustered by quarter; (3) clustered by
FoF; and (4) double-clustered by FoF and quarter.
46We use equal-weighted here because we do not observe AUMs of underlying hedge funds.
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double-clustered by FoF and quarter. Panel B presents the comparison between 13F-filing
held portfolio and 13F-filing not held portfolio. 13F-filing held portfolio earn 1.46% per
quarter in raw returns and 13F-filing not held portfolio earn 1.25% per quarter in raw
returns. The spread of the long-short portfolio is 0.21% per quarter (or 0.84% per year),
and is statistically significant at 5% level even with standard errors double-clustered by FoF
and quarter. Our results lend support to the hypothesis that investors have comparative
advantages in selecting 13F-filing hedge funds.
5.2 Holdings-Based Analysis: Non-Local Funds
To further shed light on the role of 13F filings on investor’s investment decision, we look
at how variation in the informational advantages relates to the smart money effect. Prior
research suggests that professional money managers have local preference and local infor-
mational advantages (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Teo, 2009; Sialm et al., 2019). Since
geographic proximity facilitates the information production, the monitoring, and the access
to fund managers, 13F reports should be more valuable to hedge fund investors (e.g., FoFs)
when choosing among non-local hedge funds. Therefore, we expect to find more pronounced
results when using a subset of hedge funds that are non-local to the FoFs. Following Sialm
et al. (2019), we define a fund’s location as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). We
first obtain FoF’s zip code and state information from header information reported in Form
N-CSR, N-CSRS, and N-Q filings. Using the state/zip code information, we then merge it
with the Metropolitan Areas and Components data defined by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) as of 2013.47 For each underlying hedge fund that is matched with TASS
or Form ADV, we obtain zip code and state information from TASS (zip code and state of
its management firm) and Form ADV (zip code and state reported in Item 1.F.1) and merge
it with MSA data from OMB. An underlying hedge fund is defined as non-local if its MSA
47The Metropolitan Areas and Components data is updated every 10 years, and the 2013 version is the
latest release at the time of our study.
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is different from that of the FoF.48 We then repeat our holdings-based analysis using the
subset of the non-local hedge funds. The inclusion requirement is similar. For example, in
the 13F-filing portfolio versus non-filing portfolio analysis, we require a FoF-quarter to have
(1) at least 50% of its holdings can be matched with TASS or Form ADV (and therefore we
can determine their filing statuses and geographical information), (2) its 13F-filing portfolio
contains at least one non-local 13F-filing hedge fund with valid returns, and (3) its non-filing
portfolio contains at least one non-local non-filing hedge fund with valid returns.
[Table 14 here]
Table 14 reports our holdings-based results using the subset of non-local portfolio hedge
funds. Panel A presents the comparison between 13F-filing portfolio and non-filing portfo-
lio. The final sample consists of 1,952 FoF-quarter observations from 116 FoFs, spanning
49 quarters. On average, a FoF holds 8.6 non-local “filer” hedge funds and 4.6 non-local
“non-filer” hedge funds. The results show that 13F-filing holdings earn 1.52% per quarter
in raw returns and non-filing holdings earn 1.17% per quarter in raw returns. The spread of
the long-short portfolio is 0.35% per quarter (or 1.4% per year), and is statistically signif-
icant at 5% level even with standard errors double-clustered by FoF and quarter. Panel B
presents the comparison between non-local 13F-filing held portfolio and non-local 13F-filing
not held portfolio. The final sample consists of 2,308 FoF-quarter observations from 122
FoFs, spanning 49 quarters. 13F-filing held portfolio earn 1.45% per quarter in raw returns
and 13F-filing not held portfolio earn 1.2% per quarter in raw returns. The spread of the
long-short portfolio is 0.25% per quarter (or 1% per year), and is statistically significant at
1% level even with standard errors double-clustered by FoF and quarter. The magnitude
from both tests are larger than the results in section 5.1. The results suggest that 13F reports
are more useful when investor’s informational advantage regarding the underlying hedge fund
is comparatively weak. Overall, our holdings-based analysis addresses the concern that our
results are driven by funds with different filing statuses having different investor clienteles.
48All the FoFs in our sample are located in the U.S., however, some portfolio hedge funds are located
outside the U.S.; we categorize all non-U.S. portfolio hedge funds as non-local.
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6 Conclusion
Hedge fund manager actions are largely opaque. A large information asymmetry exists
between investors and fund managers. The Rule 13(f)-1 filing requirement divulges funds’
proprietary holdings to the public, and while this has been shown to negatively impact fund
returns, we study whether it also allows investors to better evaluate and select hedge funds.
We examine whether investors’ purchasing and selling decisions, captured by hedge fund
flows, are better able to predict hedge funds’ future performance (i.e., whether the smart
money effect is stronger) for 13F-filing hedge funds than for non-filing hedge funds. We
find evidence that investor flows are indeed smarter for 13F-filing funds. In particular, we
investigate cross-sectional differences in the precision, usefulness, and access of information,
and provide evidence that the information contained in Form 13F improves investor selection
ability. Finally, we use quarterly FoFs’ holdings and show that hedge fund investors’ holdings
of 13F-filers outperform their non-filer holdings.
By providing comprehensive evidence that portfolio disclosure makes investors smarter
in selecting money managers, in a setting where managers’ actions are otherwise hard to
monitor, we highlight the benefits of mandatory portfolio disclosure and thus provide policy
makers with a more balanced understanding of the impact of Form 13F disclosure.
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Figure 1: Parallel Trends in the Sensitivity of Excess Returns to Fund Flows
Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimates of the performance-to-flow (i.e., smart-money) relationship
after controlling for firm size, averaged across countries in the treatment and control samples. The
treatment sample includes those firms that cross the filing threshold (and start filing 13F) during
the sample period from 1999Q3 and 2016Q3. The control sample includes those firms that either
never file, or always file, throughout our sample period. For each fund i in the treatment group,
we identify the first quarter q that it becomes a 13F filer. Next, we match fund i with all funds
in the control group at quarter q. We then consider the observations for fund i and its control
group at quarters q− 1, q− 2, and q− 3. We then estimate the following cross-sectional regression
for the treatment and control group, for each of the three quarters leading up to the filing event:
ExcessReti,q+1 = α+ β1Flowi,q + β2LogSizei,q−1 + εi,q. The values of β1 are then plotted below.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of our sample of hedge funds between 1999Q3 and
2016Q3. Following Shi (2017), we exclude fund of hedge funds in our sample. Flow is the percentage
fund flow during each calendar quarter. Excess Return are quarterly compounded excess return
over the risk-free rate. FH7 Alpha is the quarterly compounded Fung and Hsieh (2001) seven-factor
alpha, FH8 Alpha is the quarterly compounded Fung and Hsieh (2001) plus momentum eight-factor
alpha; both alpha measures are calculated following Agarwal et al. (2018b). Fund Size is the fund’s
assets under management at each quarter end. Fund Age is the number of months since fund
inception. Return Volatility is the return volatility using fund returns during between month t−11
and t.
Variable N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3
Flow (%/qtr) 52897 -0.270 18.350 -5.315 -0.179 3.375
Excess Return (%/qtr) 52897 1.323 9.326 -2.182 1.107 4.653
FH7 Alpha (%/qtr) 52897 0.766 9.417 -2.869 0.522 3.869
FH8 Alpha (%/qtr) 52897 0.745 9.476 -2.961 0.496 3.960
Fund Size (millions $) 52897 218.450 825.143 16.830 54.057 177.760
Fund Age (months) 52897 103.797 54.760 62.000 89.000 131.000
Return Volatility (%) 52897 11.263 9.917 4.678 8.520 14.699
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Table 2: Portfolio Sorts
This table presents the portfolio sorting results. We perform the following (2×4) portfolio sorting
analysis: at the end of every calendar quarter q, we first sort hedge funds into two groups: 13F-filers,
and non-13F filers. Within each group, we sort funds based on fund flows during quarter q into four
quartiles (labelled Low, Q2, Q3, and High). Within each group-quartile, we form value-weighted
portfolios, and rebalance quarterly. The following table reports the monthly excess returns (Panel
A), FH7 alpha (Panel B), and FH8 alpha (Panel C). The first four columns report the portfolios
sorted by flows, and the fifth column reports the long-short portfolio constructed as the high-
flow portfolio minus the low-flow portfolio. This high-minus-low portfolio is our measure of smart
money. The first row reports the non-filer groups, the second row reports the filer groups, and the
third row reports the long-short portfolio constructed as the filer group minus the non-filer group.
The bottom right cell reports the difference in high-minus-low portfolios for the filers compared to
non-filers. This measures how the smart money effect differs between the filer and non-filer groups.
Panel A: Excess Return
Flow
Low Q2 Q3 High High-Low
NonFiler 0.404*** 0.309* 0.308** 0.332** -0.072
(3.00) (1.92) (2.02) (2.46) (-0.91)
Filer 0.244 0.391** 0.345 0.513*** 0.269**
(1.49) (2.37) (1.33) (3.92) (2.15)
Filer-NonFiler -0.160 0.082 0.037 0.181** 0.341***
(-1.44) (0.81) (0.23) (2.05) (2.60)
Panel B: Fung-Hsieh 7-factor Alpha
Flow
Low Q2 Q3 High High-Low
NonFiler 0.226** 0.092 0.105 0.140 -0.085
(2.41) (0.92) (0.98) (1.54) (-1.06)
Filer 0.062 0.177 0.109 0.282*** 0.220*
(0.64) (1.62) (0.54) (2.75) (1.82)
Filer-NonFiler -0.164 0.086 0.004 0.141 0.305**
(-1.58) (0.77) (0.03) (1.37) (2.39)
Panel C: Fung-Hsieh 8-factor Alpha
Flow
Low Q2 Q3 High High-Low
NonFiler 0.205** 0.071 0.078 0.111 -0.094
(2.28) (0.75) (0.83) (1.36) (-1.18)
Filer 0.057 0.146 0.079 0.249** 0.192
(0.58) (1.54) (0.43) (2.58) (1.64)
Filer-NonFiler -0.147 0.075 0.001 0.138 0.286**
(-1.45) (0.68) (0.01) (1.35) (2.25)
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Baseline Smart Money Analysis
This table presents the baseline smart money analysis. We estimate the following regression speci-
fication: Performancei,q+1 = αi+αq +β1Flowi,q×13Fi×Posti,q +β213Fi×Posti,q +β4Flowi,q×
13Fi + β5Flowi,q + γControlsi,q + εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the return on fund i in quarter q + 1.
Depending on the specification, performance is measured as excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8
alpha. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether
fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the treatment effect. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund
i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a vector of fund level controls, including
the logarithm of assets under management, the logarithm of fund age in months, average fund flows
in quarter q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, average returns in quarter q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the
volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are fund- and quarter-level fixed effects, respectively.
We cluster standard errors at the management company level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Excess Excess Excess FH7 FH7 FH7 FH8 FH8 FH8
Flow×13F×Post 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.016** 0.019** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(3.24) (2.87) (3.18) (2.28) (2.01) (2.31) (2.93) (2.67) (2.90)
13F×Post -0.302 -0.506** -0.293 0.139 -0.023 0.201 0.058 -0.097 0.095
(-1.15) (-2.04) (-1.06) (0.45) (-0.08) (0.65) (0.18) (-0.30) (0.28)
Flow×13F -0.020*** -0.019** -0.020*** -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016** -0.015** -0.016**
(-2.69) (-2.52) (-2.59) (-1.45) (-1.32) (-1.46) (-2.10) (-1.99) (-2.06)
Flow -0.015*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.007** -0.013***
(-4.88) (-2.26) (-4.27) (-4.63) (-2.70) (-4.67) (-4.42) (-2.45) (-4.15)
LogSize -1.518*** -1.545*** -1.136*** -1.142*** -1.148*** -1.163***
(-15.20) (-14.62) (-10.46) (-10.17) (-10.23) (-9.89)
Size(millions $) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.40) (-3.70) (-3.82)
Size2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(4.47) (3.91) (4.00)
LogAge -1.685*** -2.077*** -2.080***
(-3.76) (-4.00) (-4.09)
LagFlow 0.012*** 0.002 0.003
(3.67) (0.58) (0.91)
LagRet -0.113*** -0.024 -0.066***
(-8.17) (-1.04) (-3.17)
Volatility 0.104*** 0.011 0.011
(7.86) (0.59) (0.62)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52897 52897 52897 52897 52897 52897 52897 52897 52897
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.185 0.202 0.101 0.095 0.102 0.090 0.083 0.091
# of Clusters 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775
Clustered by Company Company Company Company Company Company Company Company Company
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: RDD Smart Money Analysis
This table reports the regression results in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design. We
conduct two subsample analyses: (i) for funds that experience a filing status switch (i.e., from non-
filing to filing), we restrict the sample to those fund-quarter observations from the four-year window
around the filing status change; and (ii) following Shi (2017), we restrict the sample to fund-quarter
observations where the parent company AUM is between $50 million and $300 million. We estimate
the following regression specification: Performancei,q+1 = αi + αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi × Posti,q +
β213Fi × Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi + β5Flowi,q + γControlsi,q + εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the
return on fund i in quarter q + 1. Depending on the specification, performance is measured as
excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow of fund i in quarter
q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the treatment effect.
Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a
vector of fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under management, the logarithm of
fund age in months, average fund flows in quarter q−1, q−2, and q−3, average returns in quarter
q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are fund- and
quarter-level fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the management company
level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the results using subsample (i), and columns 4, 5, and 6 report
the results using subsample (ii).
Panel A: Subsample (i) Panel B: Subsample (ii)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excess FH7 FH8 Excess FH7 FH8
Flow×13F×Post 0.037*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.048***
(3.28) (2.21) (2.27) (3.24) (3.55) (4.01)
13F×Post -0.878* -0.545 -0.377 0.118 0.559 0.349
(-1.66) (-0.92) (-0.61) (0.24) (1.05) (0.59)
Flow×13F -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.036***
(-2.82) (-2.86) (-3.11)
Flow -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.014** -0.012* -0.013**
(-4.90) (-3.00) (-3.43) (-2.41) (-1.95) (-2.16)
LogSize -2.056*** -1.602*** -1.694*** -2.132*** -1.730*** -1.677***
(-6.03) (-4.56) (-4.33) (-9.56) (-6.77) (-6.12)
LogAge -1.466 -3.066 -3.115 -0.853 -1.421 -1.971*
(-0.70) (-1.44) (-1.37) (-1.01) (-1.25) (-1.72)
LagFlow 0.012 -0.010 -0.013 0.015*** 0.010* 0.012**
(1.30) (-1.08) (-1.32) (2.81) (1.80) (2.00)
LagRet -0.236*** -0.186*** -0.196** -0.113*** -0.038 -0.088**
(-4.29) (-2.72) (-2.39) (-4.89) (-0.80) (-2.09)
Volatility 0.196*** 0.124* 0.129* 0.114*** 0.008 0.035
(3.41) (1.92) (1.82) (3.87) (0.25) (1.10)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5638 5638 5638 19119 19119 19119
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.144 0.125 0.223 0.122 0.121
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Placebo Smart Money Analysis
This table repeats the analysis of Table 3 but with a placebo subsample. We limit the analysis to
only fund-of-hedge funds (“FoFs”). FoFs do not hold 13(f) securities, thus Form 13F should be
less informative for FoFs. We estimate the following regression specification: Performancei,q+1 =
αi+αq+β1Flowi,q×13Fi×Posti,q+β213Fi×Posti,q+β4Flowi,q×13Fi+β5Flowi,q+γControlsi,q+
εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the return on fund i in quarter q + 1. Depending on the specification,
performance is measured as excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha. Flowi,q is the percentage
fund flow of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It
captures the treatment effect. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as
of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a vector of fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under
management, the logarithm of fund age in months, average fund flows in quarter q − 1, q − 2, and
q − 3, average returns in quarter q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the volatility of past 12 month
returns. αi and αq are fund- and quarter-level fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors
at the management company level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Excess Excess Excess FH7 FH7 FH7 FH8 FH8 FH8
Flow×13F×Post -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.008
(-0.53) (-0.66) (-0.59) (0.40) (0.38) (0.48) (0.77) (0.75) (0.82)
13F×Post -0.353 -0.366 -0.363 0.047 0.017 0.097 -0.001 -0.037 0.048
(-1.48) (-1.63) (-1.33) (0.13) (0.05) (0.26) (-0.00) (-0.10) (0.12)
Flow×13F -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.83) (-0.73) (-0.77) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.40) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.72)
Flow -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(-3.48) (-1.61) (-2.58) (-0.85) (0.64) (-1.40) (-0.79) (0.75) (-1.17)
LogSize -0.648*** -0.688*** -0.479*** -0.522*** -0.521*** -0.595***
(-7.64) (-7.40) (-4.96) (-5.42) (-5.53) (-6.21)
Size(millions $) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-6.58) (-4.16) (-4.45)
Size2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(6.09) (3.52) (3.76)
LogAge -0.365 -0.409 -0.550
(-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.55)
LagFlow 0.004* 0.001 0.003
(1.95) (0.38) (1.34)
LagRet -0.131*** 0.018 -0.053
(-3.48) (0.42) (-1.18)
Volatility 0.016 -0.100** -0.123***
(0.59) (-2.36) (-3.04)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20330 20330 20330 20330 20330 20330 20330 20330 20330
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.388 0.395 0.306 0.304 0.309 0.245 0.243 0.251
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Persistence of Smart Money Effect
This table studies the smart money effect at longer horizons, going out two-, three-, and four-
quarters into the future. We estimate the following regression specification: Performancei,q+t =
αi+αq+β1Flowi,q×13Fi×Posti,q+β213Fi×Posti,q+β4Flowi,q×13Fi+β5Flowi,q+γControlsi,q+
εi,q. Performancei,q+t is the return on fund i in quarter q + t. Depending on the specification,
performance is measured as excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha. Flowi,q is the percentage
fund flow of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It
captures the treatment effect. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as
of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a vector of fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under
management, the logarithm of fund age in months, average fund flows in quarter q − 1, q − 2, and
q − 3, average returns in quarter q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the volatility of past 12 month
returns. αi and αq are fund- and quarter-level fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors
at the management company level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Excess Excess Excess FH7 FH7 FH7 FH8 FH8 FH8
Flow×13F×Post 0.002 0.009 -0.010 0.013** -0.003 -0.000 0.013* 0.000 -0.001
(0.22) (1.38) (-1.46) (1.97) (-0.42) (-0.02) (1.81) (0.02) (-0.09)
13F×Post -0.239 -0.116 -0.073 0.268 0.619** 0.635** 0.311 0.607* 0.610*
(-0.85) (-0.45) (-0.29) (0.90) (2.07) (2.11) (0.96) (1.90) (1.90)
Flow×13F 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.012* 0.004 -0.006 -0.010 0.003 -0.006
(0.25) (-0.70) (-0.44) (-1.69) (0.65) (-0.93) (-1.50) (0.49) (-0.83)
Flow -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.003 -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.003
(-2.72) (-3.34) (-0.51) (-4.58) (-3.50) (-0.67) (-4.56) (-3.31) (-0.58)
LogSize -1.373*** -1.271*** -1.052*** -1.107*** -1.046*** -0.953*** -1.094*** -0.994*** -0.908***
(-13.19) (-12.57) (-11.99) (-8.85) (-8.23) (-7.52) (-8.76) (-7.93) (-7.30)
LogAge -1.230** -0.842* -0.806* -1.716*** -1.626*** -1.591*** -1.702*** -1.443*** -1.599***
(-2.57) (-1.82) (-1.70) (-3.24) (-2.99) (-2.83) (-3.26) (-2.73) (-2.92)
LagFlow 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005 0.005 0.010*** 0.008* 0.006* 0.008** 0.005
(2.67) (2.72) (1.64) (1.54) (2.63) (1.95) (1.74) (2.00) (1.09)
LagRet -0.234*** -0.158*** -0.202*** -0.053*** -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.056*** -0.068*** -0.067**
(-18.04) (-11.87) (-11.68) (-2.74) (-4.21) (-3.02) (-2.82) (-3.00) (-2.25)
Volatility 0.086*** 0.058*** 0.074*** -0.009 0.014 0.034** 0.010 0.024 0.038***
(7.16) (5.39) (7.28) (-0.55) (0.72) (2.42) (0.66) (1.59) (2.76)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50601 48377 46206 50601 48357 46170 50601 48357 46170
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.204 0.208 0.097 0.099 0.099 0.087 0.088 0.086
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Robustness of Smart Money Effect (1)
This table reports the robustness test using alternative measures and alternative samples. The
baseline model is specified as follows: Performancei,q+1 = αi + αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi × Posti,q +
β213Fi × Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi + β5Flowi,q + γControlsi,q + εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the
return on fund i in quarter q + 1. Depending on the specification, performance is measured as
excess returns, FH7 alpha, and FH8 alpha. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow of fund i in quarter
q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the treatment effect.
Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a
vector of fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under management, the logarithm of
fund age in months, average fund flows in quarter q−1, q−2, and q−3, average returns in quarter
q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are fund- and
quarter-level fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the management company
level. In Columns 1, 2, and 3, we re-estimate our baseline regression model using alternative alphas:
CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor, and Carhart 4-factor alphas (same method as we calculate the 7-
factor and 8-factor alphas). In Columns 4, 5, and 6, we re-estimate our baseline regression model
after including all the dropped observations (i.e., the fund-quarter observations around filing status
switch and after the very last 13F filings). In Columns 7, 8, and 9, we re-estimate our baseline
regression model using only fund-quarters observations from funds that have ever changed filing
status (i.e., from non-filing to filing); we further restrict the sample so that a given fund has at
least one observation before- and one observation after- the status change. In Columns 10, 11, and
12, we re-estimate our baseline regression model using only funds that never filed 13F as control
group.
Panel A: Alt. Perf. Panel B: Full Sample Panel C: Switcher Sample Panel D: No Always-filers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CAPM FF3 Carhart Excess FH7 FH8 Excess FH7 FH8 Excess FH7 FH8
Flow×13F×Post 0.015** 0.017** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.018** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.018* 0.021** 0.025*** 0.018** 0.022**
(2.33) (2.36) (2.77) (3.00) (2.32) (2.90) (2.81) (1.82) (2.30) (3.18) (2.08) (2.56)
13F×Post -0.094 0.053 -0.011 -0.259 0.169 0.110 -0.903*** -0.202 -0.264 -0.316 0.163 0.067
(-0.36) (0.22) (-0.04) (-1.07) (0.60) (0.36) (-2.62) (-0.57) (-0.66) (-1.12) (0.50) (0.19)
Flow×13F -0.013** -0.013* -0.016** -0.017** -0.012 -0.015** -0.020*** -0.012 -0.016**
(-2.12) (-1.79) (-2.25) (-2.39) (-1.52) (-2.08) (-2.60) (-1.47) (-2.07)
Flow -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.012***
(-3.96) (-3.70) (-2.28) (-4.29) (-4.65) (-4.18) (-3.80) (-2.92) (-3.68) (-4.20) (-4.46) (-3.92)
LogSize -1.181*** -1.024*** -1.013*** -1.531*** -1.124*** -1.152*** -1.194*** -0.955*** -1.010*** -1.587*** -1.198*** -1.216***
(-12.55) (-11.43) (-10.84) (-15.09) (-10.39) (-10.18) (-7.54) (-6.29) (-6.40) (-14.21) (-9.61) (-9.32)
LogAge -1.880*** -1.980*** -1.762*** -1.563*** -1.944*** -1.966*** -1.137 -2.352** -1.938* -1.872*** -2.228*** -2.229***
(-4.29) (-4.56) (-4.20) (-3.72) (-4.00) (-4.11) (-1.21) (-2.42) (-1.93) (-3.74) (-3.83) (-3.95)
LagFlow 0.005* 0.005** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.003 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.012*** 0.003 0.003
(1.84) (2.05) (2.71) (3.77) (0.49) (0.84) (1.07) (-0.39) (-0.47) (3.36) (0.69) (0.82)
LagRet -0.110*** -0.088*** -0.104*** -0.115*** -0.024 -0.068*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 -0.127*** -0.040 -0.077***
(-7.74) (-5.21) (-5.54) (-8.32) (-1.08) (-3.25) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.28) (-8.96) (-1.63) (-3.42)
Volatility 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.031* 0.104*** 0.012 0.011 0.156*** 0.032 0.023 0.115*** 0.029 0.028
(4.85) (3.64) (1.82) (8.01) (0.63) (0.63) (4.63) (0.80) (0.52) (8.75) (1.50) (1.59)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52897 52897 52897 54725 54725 54725 9849 9849 9849 46228 46228 46228
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.102 0.099 0.201 0.100 0.089 0.243 0.113 0.099 0.192 0.105 0.094
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Robustness of Smart Money Effect (2)
This table repeats our baseline specification (equation 7) with additional fund-level control variables. The
main specification is described in the caption of Table 3. In Columns 1, 2, and 3, we re-estimate our baseline
regression model after controlling time-invariant fund-level characteristics. The additional controls variables
include the following: redemption notice period, measured in units of 30 days (RedemptionNotice), lockup
period (LockUp), management fee (MgmtFee), incentive fee (IncentiveFee), the log of one plus minimum
investment (MinInvestment), indicator variables for whether personal capital is committed (PersonalCapital),
whether there is a high water mark provision (HWM), whether the fund uses leverage (Leveraged), and
whether the fund is offshore (Offshore). Because these controls are fund-level time-invariant, we include
fund style fixed-effects instead of fund fixed-effects; note that in absence of fund fixed-effects, the stand
alone term 13F is added back to the regression specifications. In Columns 4, 5, and 6, we re-estimate the
regression model in Columns 1, 2, and 3 after including fund company fixed-effects; note that after including
fund company fixed-effects, the stand alone term 13F is again redundant.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excess FH7 FH8 Excess FH7 FH8
Flow×13F×Post 0.021*** 0.019** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.021***
(3.06) (2.53) (3.08) (2.86) (2.16) (2.78)
13F×Post -0.652*** -0.431*** -0.504*** -0.263 0.124 0.046
(-4.85) (-2.89) (-3.27) (-1.05) (0.44) (0.15)
Flow×13F -0.015** -0.011 -0.014* -0.015** -0.008 -0.013*
(-2.15) (-1.46) (-1.91) (-1.99) (-1.05) (-1.68)
Flow -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007** -0.009*** -0.008**
(-0.16) (-1.39) (-0.92) (-2.29) (-3.15) (-2.55)
13F 0.839*** 0.380*** 0.427***
(6.72) (2.67) (2.92)
LogSize -0.079*** -0.026 -0.026 -0.675*** -0.489*** -0.512***
(-2.89) (-0.76) (-0.73) (-12.01) (-8.58) (-8.52)
LogAge 0.108 -0.190* -0.219* 0.139 -0.318 -0.350*
(1.27) (-1.74) (-1.87) (0.79) (-1.63) (-1.68)
LagFlow 0.003 -0.005* -0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.97) (-1.82) (-1.62) (1.12) (-1.19) (-0.81)
LagRet 0.060*** 0.105*** 0.060*** -0.071*** 0.009 -0.035*
(4.18) (5.02) (3.00) (-5.24) (0.40) (-1.73)
Volatility 0.058*** 0.006 0.003 0.092*** 0.010 0.009
(5.93) (0.50) (0.26) (7.86) (0.62) (0.60)
RedemptionNotice 0.086 -0.028 -0.025 0.024 -0.119 -0.100
(1.57) (-0.50) (-0.45) (0.24) (-1.07) (-0.91)
LockUp 0.179** 0.103 0.137 0.096 0.018 0.068
(1.98) (0.95) (1.23) (0.51) (0.10) (0.38)
MgmtFee 0.168* -0.043 -0.090 0.021 -0.038 -0.078
(1.88) (-0.35) (-0.64) (0.13) (-0.24) (-0.48)
IncentiveFee -0.009 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.041** 0.043**
(-0.86) (1.23) (1.11) (1.53) (2.37) (2.39)
MinInvestment 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.202*** 0.276*** 0.301***
(4.53) (3.64) (3.40) (3.04) (2.68) (2.61)
PersonalCapital 0.247** -0.058 -0.117 -0.565* -0.057 -0.131
(2.08) (-0.38) (-0.75) (-1.68) (-0.14) (-0.30)
HWM 0.248** 0.249* 0.284** -0.199 -0.240 -0.273
(2.34) (1.95) (2.13) (-1.01) (-1.25) (-1.47)
Leveraged -0.020 0.060 0.026 0.226 0.136 0.115
(-0.22) (0.58) (0.25) (1.34) (0.79) (0.64)
Offshore -0.098 -0.055 -0.051 -0.409*** -0.524*** -0.528***
(-1.12) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-2.80) (-3.79) (-3.88)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52891 52891 52891 52798 52798 52798
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.073 0.060 0.197 0.101 0.090
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 45
Table 9: Cross-Sectional Smart Money Analysis: Precision of Information
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results based on the precision of information. We
split the sample in the following three ways: (i) based on the number of funds reported in TASS,
we split the sample to “single-fund company” and “multi-fund company”; (ii) based on whether a
fund is the largest fund within a fund company; and (iii) based on whether the proportion reveled
in 13F is above or below the cross-sectional median. We then estimate the following regression:
Performancei,q+1 = αi +αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi ×Posti,q + β213Fi ×Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi +
β5Flowi,q + γControlsi,q + εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the return on fund i in quarter q + 1. All
dependent variables in the regressions are FH7 factor alphas. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow
of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the
treatment effect. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q.
Controlsi,q is a vector of fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under management,
the logarithm of fund age in months, average fund flows in quarter q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, average
returns in quarter q, q−1, q−2, and q−3, and the volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are
fund- and quarter-level fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the management
company level. Method (i) is reported in Columns 1 and 2, method (ii) in Columns 3 and 4, and
method (iii) in Columns 5 and 6.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single-Fund Multi-Fund Largest Other Above Below
Company Company Fund Funds Median Median
Flow×13F×Post 0.037** 0.010 0.030*** 0.007 0.032** 0.011
(2.38) (1.01) (2.99) (0.55) (2.43) (1.03)
13F×Post -0.528 0.429 0.017 0.041 -0.196 0.412
(-0.95) (1.04) (0.05) (0.07) (-0.42) (0.89)
Flow×13F -0.027* -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.024* -0.007
(-1.93) (-0.58) (-1.58) (-0.58) (-1.96) (-0.61)
Flow -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.010 -0.017*** -0.012**
(-3.78) (-2.76) (-5.04) (-1.61) (-3.91) (-2.42)
LogSize -1.445*** -1.076*** -1.231*** -1.256*** -1.319*** -1.109***
(-8.07) (-7.30) (-9.61) (-5.94) (-8.26) (-6.89)
LogAge -2.270*** -1.759** -2.480*** -0.363 -2.447*** -1.175
(-2.93) (-2.41) (-4.53) (-0.31) (-3.46) (-1.39)
LagFlow 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
(1.04) (0.10) (0.47) (0.36) (0.67) (0.46)
LagRet -0.066** -0.019 -0.035 -0.036 -0.056** -0.020
(-2.42) (-0.57) (-1.49) (-0.92) (-2.22) (-0.54)
Volatility 0.022 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.83) (0.42) (0.62) (0.32) (0.43) (0.34)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22309 30554 37092 15671 26449 26338
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.100 0.109 0.094 0.111 0.097
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Smart Money Analysis: Flow Restrictions
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results based on whether investor can get in and out
of a fund more freely. To study this, we split the sample based on the following fund characteristics:
(i) whether a fund has lock-up provision; (ii) redemption frequency; (iii) redemption notice period;
and (iv) subscription frequency. We then estimate the following regression: Performancei,q+1 =
αi+αq+β1Flowi,q×13Fi×Posti,q+β213Fi×Posti,q+β4Flowi,q×13Fi+β5Flowi,q+γControlsi,q+
εi,q. Performancei,q+1 is the return on fund i in quarter q + 1. All dependent variables in the
regressions are FH7 factor alphas. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi
is an indicator for whether fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the treatment effect. Posti,q is
an indicator for whether fund i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a vector of
fund level controls, including the logarithm of assets under management, the logarithm of fund age
in months, average fund flows in quarter q− 1, q− 2, and q− 3, average returns in quarter q, q− 1,
q− 2, and q− 3, and the volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are fund- and quarter-level
fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the management company level. Method
(i) is reported in Columns 1 and 2, method (ii) in Columns 3 and 4, method (iii) in Columns 5 and
6, and method (iv) in Columns 7 and 8.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Redemption Redemption Redemption Redemption Subscription Subscription
Lock-Up? Lock-Up? Frequency Frequency Notice Notice Frequency Frequency
No Yes Short Long Short Long Short Long
Flow×13F×Post 0.022** 0.010 0.020* 0.012 0.019** 0.017 0.020** 0.007
(2.05) (0.86) (1.79) (1.05) (2.11) (1.03) (2.39) (0.22)
13F×Post 0.086 0.534 0.380 0.318 0.159 0.229 0.279 0.125
(0.23) (0.98) (0.96) (0.75) (0.46) (0.46) (0.87) (0.12)
Flow×13F -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.017 -0.009 -0.032** -0.011 -0.018
(-1.33) (-0.63) (-0.75) (-1.55) (-1.08) (-2.19) (-1.34) (-0.50)
Flow -0.013*** -0.017** -0.013*** -0.011* -0.017*** 0.008 -0.014*** -0.014
(-3.69) (-2.43) (-3.57) (-1.81) (-5.15) (0.96) (-4.49) (-1.11)
LogSize -1.127*** -1.170*** -0.988*** -1.355*** -1.212*** -0.587*** -1.040*** -2.127***
(-8.51) (-6.02) (-7.15) (-7.50) (-9.88) (-2.70) (-9.80) (-4.67)
LogAge -1.958*** -2.040*** -2.691*** -1.065 -1.934*** -3.321*** -2.265*** 0.506
(-3.03) (-2.84) (-3.43) (-1.49) (-3.39) (-3.47) (-4.09) (0.26)
LagFlow 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.012 0.002 -0.000
(0.57) (0.10) (0.53) (0.21) (0.95) (-1.50) (0.60) (-0.03)
LagRet -0.034 -0.009 -0.091*** 0.036 -0.036 0.102** -0.030 0.015
(-1.38) (-0.22) (-2.81) (1.27) (-1.45) (2.18) (-1.19) (0.28)
Volatility 0.025 -0.023 0.039 -0.018 0.012 -0.004 0.016 -0.017
(1.11) (-0.75) (1.58) (-0.68) (0.58) (-0.14) (0.82) (-0.38)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36537 16360 27888 25009 46912 5985 46328 6569
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.103 0.127 0.087 0.104 0.100 0.107 0.079
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Cross-Sectional Smart Money Analysis: Information Acquisition
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results based on the amount of investor attention
paid to the fund. We split funds based on the median level of investor attention. Our measures of
investor attention are based on: downloads of any 13F filings (Panel A); downloads of any filings
(Panel B); unique IPs accessing any 13F filing (Panel C); and unique IPs accessing any filing (Panel
D). We then estimate the following regression: Performancei,q+1 = αi + αq + β1Flowi,q × 13Fi ×
Posti,q + β213Fi×Posti,q + β4Flowi,q × 13Fi + β5Flowi,q + γControlsi,q + εi,q. Performancei,q+1
is the return on fund i in quarter q + 1. All dependent variables in the regressions are FH7 factor
alphas. Flowi,q is the percentage fund flow of fund i in quarter q. 13Fi is an indicator for whether
fund i ever files Form 13F. It captures the treatment effect. Posti,q is an indicator for whether fund
i has ever filed Form 13F as of quarter q. Controlsi,q is a vector of fund level controls, including
the logarithm of assets under management, the logarithm of fund age in months, average fund flows
in quarter q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, average returns in quarter q, q − 1, q − 2, and q − 3, and the
volatility of past 12 month returns. αi and αq are fund- and quarter-level fixed effects, respectively.
We cluster standard errors at the management company level.
Panel A: # of
Downloads as pro-
portion of all 13F
Traffic
Panel B: # of
Downloads as
proportion of all
EDGAR Traffic
Panel C: # of
unique IPs as pro-
portion of all 13F
Traffic
Panel D: # of
Unique IPs as
proportion of all
EDGAR Traffic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Flow×13F×Post 0.021* 0.010 0.021* 0.009 0.020* 0.014 0.020* 0.013
(1.88) (0.79) (1.88) (0.67) (1.82) (1.19) (1.87) (1.09)
13F×Post -0.124 -0.386 -0.142 -0.397 -0.014 -0.536 -0.050 -0.489
(-0.28) (-0.93) (-0.32) (-0.93) (-0.03) (-1.26) (-0.11) (-1.12)
Flow -0.023** -0.026** -0.023** -0.024** -0.026** -0.024** -0.026*** -0.023**
(-2.38) (-2.37) (-2.47) (-2.22) (-2.56) (-2.23) (-2.66) (-2.13)
LogSize -0.825*** -1.060*** -0.832*** -1.034*** -0.841*** -1.040*** -0.837*** -1.027***
(-6.05) (-5.69) (-6.07) (-5.59) (-6.30) (-5.43) (-6.22) (-5.32)
LogAge -2.560*** -2.327** -2.621*** -2.338** -2.688*** -1.960** -2.232*** -2.603***
(-3.00) (-2.46) (-3.10) (-2.46) (-3.18) (-2.09) (-2.65) (-2.91)
LagFlow -0.012 0.006 -0.011 0.005 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 0.004
(-1.63) (0.77) (-1.51) (0.63) (-1.34) (0.46) (-1.35) (0.50)
LagRet -0.007 -0.053 -0.002 -0.059 -0.017 -0.038 -0.018 -0.044
(-0.19) (-1.39) (-0.06) (-1.54) (-0.46) (-1.05) (-0.48) (-1.15)
Volatility 0.006 0.047 0.005 0.050 0.007 0.050 0.006 0.057
(0.15) (0.87) (0.12) (0.92) (0.19) (0.90) (0.17) (0.98)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10260 7544 10307 7497 10330 7474 10560 7244
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.129 0.103 0.129 0.098 0.135 0.097 0.141
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Summary Statistics: FoFs Holdings
This table presents the summary statistics of our sample of 127 fund-of-hedge funds (“FoFs”)
between 2004Q3 and 2016Q4. Following Gao et al. (2019), we identify and collect quarterly holdings
of FoFs form SEC filings. We match each underlying hedge fund with TASS and Form ADV, and
classify them to 13F-filing funds or non-filing funds. Panel A shows the summary statistics of
sample FoFs at the end of 2004; Panel B shows the summary statistics of sample FoFs at the end
of 2010; Panel C shows the summary statistics of sample FoFs at the end of 2016. FoF AUM is
the summation of current values of all underlying hedge funds; # of Holdings is the number of
hedge funds currently held; # of Filer Held is the number of underlying hedge funds categorized
as “filer”; Filer AUM is the proportion of FoF’s assets that invested in “filer” hedge funds; # of
Non-Filer Held is the number of underlying hedge funds categorized as “non-filer”; Non-Filer AUM
is the proportion of FoF’s assets that invested in “non-filer” hedge funds.
Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3
Panel A: 2004Q4 (Number of FoFs: 49)
FoF AUM (millions $) 188.751 335.787 50.827 75.795 188.969
# of Holdings 23.714 13.342 15.000 21.000 29.000
# of Filer Held 6.592 4.354 4.000 6.000 8.000
Filer AUM (%) 29.879 12.936 18.361 31.361 37.814
# of Non-Filer Held 6.184 4.091 3.000 6.000 7.000
Non-Filer AUM (%) 27.140 12.912 20.528 25.481 29.516
Panel B: 2010Q4 (Number of FoFs: 46)
FoF AUM (millions $) 392.293 881.760 30.470 118.927 430.999
# of Holdings 30.522 28.226 17.000 23.500 37.000
# of Filer Held 16.630 10.586 10.000 14.000 22.000
Filer AUM (%) 65.055 19.046 51.545 66.124 78.300
# of Non-Filer Held 8.870 14.938 2.000 6.500 11.000
Non-Filer AUM (%) 23.405 12.739 12.763 24.570 33.938
Panel C: 2016Q4 (Number of FoFs: 45)
FoF AUM (millions $) 411.710 817.576 55.833 140.936 462.664
# of Holdings 28.333 26.061 16.000 24.000 31.000
# of Filer Held 18.467 10.235 12.000 17.000 23.000
Filer AUM (%) 74.555 18.281 66.034 77.632 88.837
# of Non-Filer Held 7.644 15.094 1.000 4.000 10.000
Non-Filer AUM (%) 19.797 16.737 7.581 15.838 28.460
49
Table 13: FoFs Holdings-Based Analysis: Full Sample
This table reports the holdings-based analysis using our sample of FoFs and the entire sample
of underlying hedge funds. At the end of each calendar quarter, we assign underlying hedge
funds in each FoF’s portfolio to one of two portfolios. We then compute the quarterly returns
on the two portfolios over the next quarter. Within a given FoF-quarter, hedge funds are value-
weighted and then we average calendar time portfolios across FoFs and quarters. Standard errors
are clustered using various methods (no clustering, clustered by quarter, clustered by FoF, and
double-clustered by FoF and quarter) and are reported in parentheses. The first two columns
report the average returns of the two portfolios, and the third column reports return of the long-
short portfolio constructed using these two portfolios. In Panel A, we examine FoF’s 13F-filing
holdings and its non-filing holdings. In Panel B, we examine 13F-filing hedge funds currently held
and 13-filing hedge funds currently not held.
Panel A: Filer Portfolio vs NonFiler Portfolio
NonFiler Filer Filer-NonFiler
Raw Returns (% per quarter) 1.353 1.585 0.232
t-statistics:
No Clustering (12.17)*** (17.57)*** (2.60)***
Clustered by Quarter (2.89)*** (3.37)*** (1.79)*
Clustered by FoF (13.09)*** (21.20)*** (2.29)**
Clustered by FoF and Quarter (2.90)*** (3.39)*** (1.68)*
Panel B: Filer Held vs Filer Not Held
Filer Not Held Filer Held Held-NotHeld
Raw Returns (% per quarter) 1.246 1.459 0.213
t-statistics:
No Clustering (18.40)*** (16.66)*** (3.63)***
Clustered by Quarter (2.58)*** (3.03)*** (2.26)**
Clustered by FoF (29.58)*** (20.89)*** (3.17)***
Clustered by FoF and Quarter (2.60)*** (3.05)*** (2.13)**
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: FoFs Holdings-Based Analysis: Non-Local Funds
This table reports the holdings-based analysis using our sample of FoFs and the subset of non-local
hedge funds. An underlying hedge fund is defined as non-local if it is located in a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) that is different from that of the FoF. At the end of each calendar quarter,
we assign underlying hedge funds in each FoF’s portfolio to one of two portfolios. We then compute
the quarterly returns on the two portfolios over the next quarter. Within a given FoF-quarter, hedge
funds are value-weighted and then we average calendar time portfolios across FoFs and quarters.
Standard errors are clustered using various methods (no clustering, clustered by quarter, clustered
by FoF, and double-clustered by FoF and quarter) and are reported in parentheses. The first two
columns report the average returns of the two portfolios, and the third column reports return of the
long-short portfolio constructed using these two portfolios. In Panel A, we examine FoF’s 13F-filing
holdings and its non-filing holdings. In Panel B, we examine 13F-filing hedge funds currently held
and 13-filing hedge funds currently not held.
Panel A: Filer Portfolio vs NonFiler Portfolio
NonFiler Filer Filer-NonFiler
Raw Returns (% per quarter) 1.170 1.521 0.351
t-statistics:
No Clustering (8.89)*** (14.96)*** (2.98)***
Clustered by Quarter (2.42)** (3.14)*** (2.35)**
Clustered by FoF (8.95)*** (17.84)*** (2.69)***
Clustered by FoF and Quarter (2.42)** (3.16)*** (2.20)**
Panel B: Filer Held vs Filer Not Held
Filer Not Held Filer Held Held-NotHeld
Raw Returns (% per quarter) 1.202 1.450 0.248
t-statistics:
No Clustering (16.87)*** (15.02)*** (3.57)***
Clustered by Quarter (2.40)** (2.96)*** (3.06)***
Clustered by FoF (28.48)*** (18.64)*** (3.13)***
Clustered by FoF and Quarter (2.41)** (2.98)*** (2.77)***
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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